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Faculty and Deans

AND THE REBUTTAL

Glenn E. Coven
In the past decade the sophistication of the analysis of the relationship between income taxation and the passage of time by both
scholars 1 and Congress has increased enormously. Little of that sophistication, however, has rubbed off on the courts. In this increasingly critical area, the Supreme Court remains 20 to 50 years out of
date; the opinion in Indianapolis Power could have been written
by Justice Jackson.
That failure on the part of the Court provoked the commentaries of myself2 and Professor Yin. 3 While the areas in which we
disagree may be of greater academic interest, the areas in which we
do agree are of greater practical importance and should be underscored. Importantly, we agree that the tests ·employed by the
courts in general and the Supreme Court in particular for distinguishing between the proceeds of a loan and a taxable receipt are
fundamentally defective and require urgent revision. Secondly (although Professor Yin might not put it just this way), we appear to
agree that debt for income tax purposes ought to mean a receipt
that is offset by a repayment obligation that bears a market rate of
interest-and nothing more or less. The difference between Professor Yin and myself is that for this purpose I would only recognize
interest that was actually structured into the transaction by the
parties while Professor Yin would recast their transaction along
the lines of section 7872 to create interest (at a market rate) that
would protect the remaining portion of the receipt from tax.
To explore this point of disagreement, we might examine four
more taxpayers who otherwise are in identical income tax positions. Each receives a receipt of $10,000 at time 0, invests the receipt at a 10 percent return, and disburses an amount equal to the
' For recent examples, see Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of Multi-Period Projects: An
Analysis of Competing Models, 69 Texas L. Rev. 1109 (1991); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and
Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 Yale L.J. 1'817 (1990).
• Glenn E. Coven, Redefining Debt: Of Indianapolis Power and Fictitious Interest, 10 Va.
Tax Rev. 587 (1991).
• George K. Yin, Of Indianapolis Power and Light and the Definition of Debt: Another
View, 11 Va. Tax Rev. 467 (1991).
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receipt exactly six years later, at time 6. In the absence of taxation,
each would have gained an identical accession to wealth. Now introduce income taxation-our system of income taxation. Will the
taxpayers be left in identical after-tax positions? Of course not.
A's receipt was salary. It will be taxed immediately as will the
return on her investment. Her disbursement was for fully deductible educational expenses related to her employment. At time 6, after her disbursement, she will be left with $3,500. D's receipt consisted of compensation of $4,360 and the proceeds of a discounted
loan obtained from a Bank in the amount of $5,640. The loan
transaction is effectively exempt from income taxation;' at time 6
he will be left with $4,578 attributable to the investment of the
compensation. On facts that are identical in the absence of taxation, under our income tax system D would be taxed far more
lightly than A and that result is appropriate. 11
B's transaction is essentially identical to A's. The difference is
that B returned his receipt to his employer because it had been
paid to him in error. Under our system, B will be subject to the
same pattern of tax as A; thus B will be left in the same after-tax
economic position as A.
C is the one who holds our attention. C received an interest free
loan6 from her employer and the issue 'is whether C should be
taxed like A and B, or like D, since she cannot be taxed like both.
That is, should C's unitary $10,000 receipt be fully taxed (and deducted upon repayment) or treated as salary of $4,360 and the proceeds of a loan of $5,640 and thus only partially taxed? To put the

• The taxable return on the investment of the loan proceeds will be offset by the accrued
deduction for the interest payable.
• Of course, D could be taxed like A. The proceeds of his loan could be made taxable and
his repayment deductible. In that event, however, the investment of the loan proceeds
would not generate sufficient income to pay the interest on his loan and thus the loan transaction, viewed in isolation, would result in an after-tax economic loss. D therefore would be
required to use the return on the investment of his salary to pay the interest on his loan.
If the loan and the salary were viewed together as a unitary receipt, current taxation of
the total proceeds would not result in an economic loss and thus might not be seen as improper. Nevertheless, we do regard the compensation and the loan as entirely separate
transactions and, accordingly, would regard taxing D like A to be wrong.
• Following convention, I refer to such transfers as loans. The issue here, however, is not
the label attached to the transaction but the treatment of the transaction for income tax
purposes. On that issue, there is nothing magic about the existence of the repayment obliga- .
tion. As I sought to demonstrate in my article, if the repayment obligation is not interest
bearing, there is no reason to exclude the receipt from income.
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question in context, consider some real world C's:
-A public utility demands a deposit from certain customers
which is commingled with its general funds. Deposits are continually received and returned; the utility is effectively in permanent
possession of an unrestricted, non-interest bearing pool of capital
of several million dollars.
-A custom manufacturer demands a payment before commencing the construction of the goods ordered, and payment is immediately spent by the manufacturer on components.
-A closely held corporation transfers $2 million to a principal
shareholder, a key employee. The funds are spent on the individual's consumption and are not repaid until the- death of the payee.
Upon the payee's death, :the loan is repaid and the funds withdrawn through the redemption of stock, the basis of which has
been stepped up to market value.
While in every ins~ance it would indeed be possible to recast
these receipts as loans in part under a section 7872-type bifurcation approach, thereby taxing each "C" far more lightly than
would occur if the receipt were immediately taxable, it is not at all
clear why we would wish to do that. In each instance the payee will
derive an economic benefit indistinguishable from the benefit of
the receipt of income over the period of time in which the receipt
is retained. Indeed, in general, an interest free advance is a tax
motivated transaction designed to permit an immediate economic
receipt but defer the attendant tax liability. Moreover, a deduction
for the repayment, if and when it occurs, will adequately compensate for C's year 6 disbursement just as it adequately compensates
for A's and B's. In fact, C's single transaction is not meaningfully
different from B's or A's but bears little resemblance to D's two
separate transactions. Should not, therefore, C be taxed like A and
not likeD?
Professor Yin's response to all of this is that the niore favorable
treatment of C is in fact required by the internal logic of the taxing
system. I disagree.
Professor Yin begins with the premise that any reciprocal exchange of value in which the performance of the parties is separated by time creates a loan, either expressly or impliedly. Moreover, Professor Yin evidently accepts what I conceive to be the
consensus view that the existence of a loan necessarily requires the
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existence of interest. 7 Since interest is present by definition and is
borne by the borrower, it must also be taxed to the lender. Professor Yin thus asserts that any system of taxation, such as the one I
propose, that does not tax the lender on the interest earned improperly undertaxes the lender and overtaxes the borrower. 8 From
that beginning, Professor Yin concludes that the correct approach
to interest free transfers is bifurcation along the lines of section
7872.
The assertion that non-simultaneous exchanges of value do bear
interest is quite misleading. As a matter of economic fact, interest
is either paid with respect to a receipt or it is not. If it is paid, then
neither my proposal nor section 7872 have any application to the
transaction. 9 If it is not, it only confuses the analysis to assert that
an interest burden is borne in a transaction in which it concededly
is not borne. Rather, the issue involves identifying the most appropriate income tax burden for one ·who· obtains a non-interest bearing receipt.
The section 7872 bifurcation approach, which Professor Yin
seems to prefer, proceeds from the assumption that the recipient
does not bear the economic burden of interest payments with respect to the amount transferred. Given that factual assumption,
the section then imposes a burden of taxation on the recipient that
approximates the tax that Would have been paid if the transaction
had assumed a radically different form: the loan of a lesser
amount, at a market rate of interest, plus the making of a functionally unrelated payment. The question reexamined in my article
was whether it made any sense for income tax purposes to construct so elaborately interest free transfers. Presumably, such areconstruction should be undertaken only if the resulting tax burden
were superior to any alternative treatment of the transaction.
That, however, is not the case.
The tax burden imposed by section 7872 on the "borrower" is
substantfally lower than the burden that would have been imposed
if the receipt had been treated as immediately taxable income.
That reduced tax burden is presumably justified by the fact that
• See Yin, supra note 3, at 474.
• See id. at 479.
• For analytical purposes, I am following Professor Yin in ignoring the intermediate case
of low interest loans.
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the recipient is now viewed as paying interest and the principle
that taxing the proceeds of an interest bearing loan is improper.
But, the bifurcation of the transaction for tax purposes does not,
and cannot, alter its economic substance: the "borrower" in fact
does not repay more than was received and thus does not in fact
pay interest. Accordingly, as I sought to demonstrate in my article,
there is no justification for the reduced burden of taxation that
section 7872 extends. Since the "borrower" will retain the entire
investment return attributable to the receipt, the · "borrower"
should be taxed in the same manner as any other recipient of a
non-interest bearing receipt 10 , notwithstanding the theoretical obligation to repay the principal amount of the receipt at some future
date.
Moreover, the logic of the argument that interest must be present in non-simultaneous exchanges does not lead to the bifurcation conclusion. That discrepancy appears quite clearly in Professor Yin's argument that lenders are undertaxed under my
proposal. Starting with the premise that the transaction is a loan,
he observes that the capital invested by the borrower is that of the 'lender and that the lender is entitled to a return on that capital.
He then asserts that the lender should be taxed as if that return
had been received (although it was not). 11 If this analysis were
adopted, however, it would seem to follow that the entire amount
•• The argument set forth in my article was not that the recipient should be taxed on the
investment return because he or she retained all of it but rather was that, because of the
recipient's entitlement to that return, the initial receipt should be taxed as income rather
than excluded as the proceeds of a loan. See Coven, supra note 2, at 611-12.
Nevertheless, Professor Yin's ultimate criticism of my proposal is that it would fail to tax
the lender on the investment return to which it is "entitled" but does not receive while it
would tax the borrower on the investment return to which it is not entitled but does in fact
receive. In a commercial transaction between unrelated parties, it is not clear why that is a
fault.
" This argument may be recognized as essentially an assignment of income analysis. Historically certain types of interest free transfers were employed to accomplish a temporary
shifting of income from capital that should have been attacked under the traditional assignment of income rules. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The failure of the Internal Revenue Service to invoke those rules was in part responsible for the need for section
7872.
When (1) the transferee is not subject to tax upon obtaining the initial receipt and (2) the
transferee is in a lower income tax bracket than is the transferor, my proposal would resurrect the pre-section 7872 potential for using interest free transfers to assign income improperly. Accordingly, such gratuitous transfers would require scrutiny under the normal assignment of income rules as do all other temporary transfers of capital among related taxpayers.
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of the receipt, all of which must be repaid, constituted the lender's
capital upon which a return should be paid. Professor Yin, however, consistently with the section 7872 approach, treats as the
lender's capital only that portion of the loan that under bifurcation
would be treated as the principal amount lent. 12 That definition of
the "lender's capital" is purely arbitrary. 13 As I argued in my article, bifurcation simply does not reflect the economic substance of
an interest free transfer and produces an improper income tax
result.
While bifurcation is not appropriate, Professor Yin's argument
that interest must be present in non-simultaneous transfers does
suggest another approach to the "interest free" receipt problem.
The taxing system might require' that we look much harder for the
existence of interest in fact. In many cases, that closer scrutiny will
be to no avail. Contrary to Professor Yin's assumption, some transfers are simply not interest bearing. When, for example, an interest
free advance is made to a dominant shareholder in a closely held
corporation, no value flows back from the shareholder to the cor,. poration in substitution for interest that is worth identifying. In
other cases, careful case-by-case examination may disclose the existence of interest. In fact, such an argument could be made on the
facts of Indianapolis Power.
The implication of the argument that interest must be present is
that the borrower is compensating the lender for the use of the
receipt outside of their formal transaction through a transfer of
goods or services. In Indianapolis Power it might be argued that
the utility-borrower was transferring to its customers value in the
form of making sales on credit to the otherwise non-creditworthy
customer. The receipt of that service, in the nature of interest,
should thus be currently taxed to the customer. Reconstructing the
transaction to make it understandable (?), it is as if the utility paid
interest on the deposit and the customer returned that amount as
an increased cost of electrical service. The utility would have an
interest deduction offset by an increased income froni sales while
the customer would have interest income not offset by the increased consumption expense.
Whether it would be very sensible to search that hard for the
11
11

See Yin, supra note 3, at 479.
Professor Yin may not wholly disagree with this conclusion. See id. at 483, note 54.
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existence of interest, and thus avoid the pattern of taxation that I
propose, is questionable. Firstly, and in sharp contrast to the taxation of Abbie in my article (who obtained a conventional interest
bearing loan), taxing the receipt does not prevent the recipient
from funding the obligation to pay interest. The constructive interest payment and offsetting receipt are entirely fictitious; they have
no economic significance. Secondly, such a recharacterization is
wholly unadministerable, as Professor Yin appears to recognize. 14
Imposing an actual tax on the customers of Indianapolis Power is,
to put it mildly, not feasible and suitable proxies for such a tax are
not apparent. Therefore, if such an approach to interest free receipts were accepted in principle, the approach would not be applied in practice and the transaction would remain undertaxed.
Nevertheless, if a receipt is offset by a repayment obligation that is
in fact interest bearing, albeit in disguise, the receipt constitutes
the proceeds of a loan and in principle ought not be subject to
current taxation, nor should it be bifurcated. 111
The bifurcation of an interest free transfer is an example of economic analysis going astray. The creation of an interest substitute
through a present value computation is intellectually satisfying
and widely appealing. Unfortunately, it does not produce an income tax result that is as consistent with the balance of the taxing
system as does the simple taxation of the receipt. Accordingly, receipts that are only offset by non-interest bearing repayment obligations should not be treated as loans for income tax purposes.

•• See id. at 487.
'" Professor Yin also observes that the pattern of taxation that I propose is not consistent
with the requirements of a full current accrual approach to income taxation. That may be
so. Under full accrual, many transactions would be taxed differently. However, under the
existing tax system, unrealized gains and losses in assets or liabilities are not reflected for
income tax purposes on a current basis. The annual increase in the burden of repayment of
a discounted obligation would only be reflected for income tax purposes if that increase
represented a built-in interest factor. However, if the transaction is an interest free loan (or
other advance), the transaction will not coniain interest unless the transaction has already
been bifurcated along the lines of section 7872. Professor Yin's criticism, therefore, either
assumes the very point in dispute, that C's receipt should be bifurcated, or is derived from a
concept of taxation that is not currently a part of our taxing system.

